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SYNGENTA, STEPHENSON AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
INJUNCTIVE POWER
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman*

INTRODUCTION
Over the last two terms, the United States Supreme Court has heard
oral argument in two cases with important implications for complex
litigation. The two cases—Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson1
and Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson2—raised distinctive legal issues
but both fundamentally concerned the problem of federal judicial power
to enjoin litigants from pursuing state proceedings after a federal
judgment has been rendered. In Syngenta, the Court resoundingly
rejected use of the All Writs Act to enjoin an infringing state case by
removing it to federal court. In so ruling, the Court reaffirmed that, in
appropriate cases, an injunction may issue to enjoin prosecution of state
suits after federal judgment.
By sharp contrast, Stephenson, which involved a collateral attack
on a prior federal class action certification ruling, left the justices evenly
divided (with Justice Stevens having recused himself) and the scope of
federal judicial injunctive power in this class action context undefined.
It would be a mistake, however, to treat the case lightly. Though
technically a non-decision, Stephenson unmistakably signals a
willingness by four justices to proscribe collateral attacks on a federal
court’s prior judgment in a case, even when the attack is brought by
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I am grateful to Susan
Koniak and Henry Monaghan for their feedback on an earlier draft of this article. Thanks also to
Darci Deltorto and the rest of the editors of the Akron Law Review for organizing this symposium.
The University of Houston Foundation provided financial support for this project. Finally, a note of
full disclosure is in order. On behalf of the State of Texas, I filed, pro bono, an amicus brief in
support of the respondent in the Syngenta case. My interest in the case originated with an article I
had previously written several years earlier. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the
All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1999).
1. 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
2. 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
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persons who did not participate in the case and who argued that they
were not adequately represented by those who did. The implications of
this signal are profound: if the position of this plurality commands only
one more member of the Court, it would mean for the class action
context a vastly greater federal judicial authority to enjoin collateral
attacks brought in the state forum.
This paper takes up the question of the limits of a federal court’s
authority post-Syngenta and -Stephenson to enjoin litigants from
prosecuting state suits brought concurrently with an ongoing federal case
or after a federal judgment has been handed down. In particular, my
objectives are three-fold. As regards Syngenta, I will examine the case’s
background and procedural history to highlight the strategic decisionmaking and forum shopping decisions made by all of the parties and
their lawyers in the contest. Also, by revisiting the Supreme Court’s
decision in the case, I hope to offer a better perspective on what the
justices did decide and, correspondingly, also reflect on what they did
not decide. Even as Syngenta nodded in recognition that some power
exists to enjoin state proceedings, its ambit was left undefined.
Recognizing the scope of the Court’s decision is critical if any insight is
to be gained into the import the decision bears on the limits of the
federal judicial injunctive power.
My second objective concerns Stephenson. Like the earlier study
of Syngenta, the examination of Stephenson will also consider the case’s
background and procedural history. Because there ultimately was no
decision by a majority of the Court in the case, Part II of this paper more
carefully parses the intermediate appellate court’s opinion, along with
the positions advanced by the parties and their amici before the United
States Supreme Court. Examining the arguments in this manner helps to
frame the parameters of the debate over federal injunctive power as it
arose in the Stephenson context.
Finally, Part III considers, in the aftermath of Syngenta and
Stephenson, the future battles we should expect over the use of the civil
injunctive power by federal judges to restrain state litigants. In
considering the legal questions likely on the near horizon, we will also
discover the most important and revealing connection between these
ostensibly unrelated cases. Read together, Syngenta and Stephenson
suggest that what is at stake in articulating the limits of federal judicial
injunctive power to enjoin coordinate state proceedings is not only the
accommodation of competing sovereign interests but also the evaluation
of strategic decision-making by litigants and its influence on judicial
decision-making. If Syngenta reminds us that litigants may sometimes
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invoke the state courts to try to game the system in inappropriate ways,
Stephenson reflects that without proper safeguards and review even
federal judgments may be called into doubt. Put another way, the cases
indicate that the problem of legitimacy can be bilateral. A recent study
by Thomas Willging and Shannon Wheatman for the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) bolsters this conclusion. They found that, on the whole,
state and federal judges handle class litigation in approximately the same
manner, in terms of how frequently certification is granted (whether for
trial or for settlement) as well as in their rulings on dispositive pretrial
motions.3 These findings suggest that there is no valid basis for
presuming federal judges will be more fair or efficient in their treatment
of complex case litigation than state judges. At the same time, the FJC’s
findings cut across all courts and should not be read to mask that
particular judges—or multiple judges in a particular region—may fail to
properly evaluate and manage cases that are before them. By directing
sharper focus on this evaluative responsibility judges bear, our study of
Syngenta and Stephenson may bring us closer to a better conception of
preclusion law and a more unified framework for defining the limits of
and appropriate tolerance for “jurisdictional redundancy,” as Bob Cover
once put it, in our peculiar system of courts with overlapping
jurisdiction.4
I. SYNGENTA
A. In the Beginning
The origins of the Court’s decision in Syngenta may be traced to
Iberville Parish, Louisiana. It was there that Hurley Henson and several
other plaintiffs (the “Henson plaintiffs”) sought recovery from the
chemical manufacturer Ciba-Geigy Corporation (renamed Syngenta
Crop Protection, Inc. by the time certiorari was granted by the U.S.
Supreme Court) for damages sustained as a result of their exposure to an
insecticide manufactured and sold by the company. The only problem
was that the Henson plaintiffs had previously been plaintiffs in a prior
lawsuit filed against the same defendant in the United States District

3. Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R. Wheatman, ATTORNEY REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF
AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES REGARDING A CASE-BASED SURVEY OF
ATTORNEYS (April 2004). A copy of the full report may be accessed through the link www.fjc.gov.
4. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest Ideology and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
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Court for the Southern District of Alabama.5 Indeed, not only had the
Henson plaintiffs been plaintiffs in the federal case, Price v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., but they had even opted into a settlement where, in exchange for
monetary payment by the company, they agreed to dismiss with
prejudice their claims against the chemical company.6 Yet, after
depositing their settlement checks and dutifully signing the settlement
agreement, the Henson plaintiffs directed their counsel to assert new
claims against the same defendant in a Louisiana state court.7
There are two sides to every story, of course, and the Henson
plaintiffs’ was that when they sought to litigate again in state court they
were seeking relief for a different injury: namely, exposure to Atrazine,
not the chlorodimeform-based insecticide known as Galecron that was at
issue in the Price litigation. On this fine distinction, the Henson
plaintiffs argued that they were asserting claims for relief which were
not disposed of by the federal settlement. They insisted that the
company did not negotiate a settlement of all claims but that resolution
covered only claims relating to exposure to Galecron, the particular
chemical that was the subject of the federal litigation.
The state court judge apparently was persuaded by the distinction,
though it has been suggested that plaintiffs’ counsel “successfully
misled” the judge.8 Whether by guile or otherwise, the Henson plaintiffs
received an invitation from the state judge to amend the state petition to
make plain that the claims they were bringing arose solely from their
exposure to Atrazine and, therefore, were not barred by the federal
settlement.
5. To be precise, Henson was one of the named plaintiffs in the Iberville Parish suit that was
filed as a class action on behalf of all individuals whom Ciba-Geigy employed at its St. Gabriel,
Louisiana, facility. Filed on September 15, 1993, this suit preceded the filing of the case that was
certified eventually by Judge Butler in the Southern District of Alabama. See Brief of Petitioner at
*2, Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002) (No. 01-757), available at 2002 WL
956371 (noting that the federal case began as a separate state suit in Mobile County, Alabama, and
was properly removed to federal district court on January 30, 1995). Before any class was certified
by the Louisiana state judge, Henson and other Louisiana residents employed at the defendant’s St.
Gabriel facility decided to suspend their state court action and try, instead, to intervene in the
federal litigation. It was only after the federal settlement that Henson and the other intervenors
returned to state court and sought to reopen the state proceedings to seek further relief against CibaGeigy (n.k.a. Syngenta).
6. Judgment was then entered approving the settlement under Rule 23 by Judge Butler, the
presiding judge in Price.
7. The Henson plaintiffs also named several individual defendants in their state court suit. It
was the presence of these individual defendants that destroyed the diversity of citizenship that
otherwise existed between plaintiffs and Syngenta and, thereby, necessitated the company’s reliance
on the All Writs Act to attempt to remove the otherwise unremovable case.
8. Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F.3d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Rather unhappy with their luck before the state trial judge, the
chemical company (and the three individual defendants also named in
the suit) removed the state court case to the Middle District of Louisiana,
relying principally on the All Writs Act and the assertion that the state
court action threatened to interfere with the prior federal judgment which
had approved the settlement and dismissed all claims against the
company. Transfer was then immediately requested under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) to the Southern District of Alabama and, though the record is
silent on how they accomplished this, the skillful lawyers for the
chemical company also succeeded in getting the case back before Judge
Butler.9 Once there, the defendants fared far better in their argument
that the Henson plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed on the grounds
that all such claims had already been settled and dismissed. Indeed, so
incensed was Judge Butler by the actions taken in Iberville Parish after
the settlement, that once the Henson plaintiffs were back before him he
not only dismissed their case with prejudice but he also imposed a
sanction of $27,000 against counsel to cover the defendants’ legal fees in
enforcing the federal settlement.
Stymied from pursuing the state court action, the Henson plaintiffs
and their counsel appealed the dismissal and the sanctions order,
respectively, to the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court began by
readily affirming the sanctions order against plaintiffs’ counsel. The
Henson plaintiffs’ lawyer had argued that the federal judge had no
further jurisdiction to sanction him since the case was already dismissed.
Not so, the Eleventh Circuit intoned, since he was counsel of record in
the federal action and it was within the court’s power to sanction him for
interfering with carrying out the settlement terms, citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc.10 It also bears noting that the Henson plaintiffs could not
have argued that the federal district judge lacked power to enjoin them
9. Section 1404 authorizes transfer between districts but does not give defendants the
authority to select a particular judge in the transferee federal district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(stating “a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought”). It is possible, of course, that by the luck of the draw the case ended up back in
front of the federal judge who oversaw the federal class settlement. It is more likely, though, that
defendants successfully brought the case before Judge Butler by asserting that the
removed/transferred action was related to the Price case previously before him and that the
governing local rules permitted assignment back to the presiding judge of that case. See S.D. ALA.
LOCAL R 3.3, available at http://www.als.uscourts.gov/district-court/ forms/local-rules.pdf. (“If the
Civil Cover Sheet . . . indicates that the civil action in which it is filed is related to another action or
actions pending in this district, the action shall be assigned to the district judge before whom the
related action with the lowest file number is pending or as may be otherwise determined by the chief
judge.”).
10. See Henson, 261 F.3d. at 1068 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991)).
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from filing suit in Louisiana because as intervenors into the federal
litigation the court had in personam jurisdiction over them. Yet, as
Henry Monaghan has noted, jurisdiction will often be an important
barrier to the issuance of an anti-suit injunction, restricting a federal
court’s power to enjoin nonresident plaintiffs who lack the requisite
contacts with the forum in which the federal court is located.11 We will
return to this issue again in Part III.
While the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge’s authority to
sanction the Henson plaintiffs’ counsel, it found that the federal district
judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Henson plaintiffs’ state
case and that resorting to the All Writs Act did not cure the jurisdictional
defect.12 Central to the court’s conclusion were two principles: first, that
§1441(a) authorizes removal only of civil actions “of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction;” and, second, that
“the All Writs Act does not provide an independent basis of federal
subject matter jurisdiction.”13 Because the All Writs Act could not be
relied upon to fill the absence of original jurisdiction, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that removal of the Henson plaintiff’s state case was
not authorized.
B. Before the Fall
When the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district judge and ordered
the case remanded, it was only the second court of appeals to find a
subject matter jurisdiction defect in basing removal on the All Writs
Act.14 Every other circuit court and nearly all district courts to consider
the question had concluded that the All Writs Act could be invoked as a
residual basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the removed case
which otherwise lacked an independent basis for remaining in federal
11. Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunction and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident
Class Members, 98 COLUM. L REV. 1148, 1148 (1998). See also infra note 14.
12. Henson, 261 F.3d at 1070-71.
13. Id. at 1070 (citing, inter alia, Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999) (affirming All
Writs Act does not contain independent grant of original jurisdiction); Lonny S. Hoffman, Removal
Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 433-39 (1999) (discussing history of All
Writs Act)).
14. The only other circuit court to do so was Hillman v. Webley, 115 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the All Writs Act does not allow a court to acquire jurisdiction over a party
otherwise not subject to its jurisdiction). Indeed, for that matter, only two district courts had ever
concluded that the All Writs Act could not be used to remove an otherwise unremovable case. See,
e.g., Fidelity Fin. v. Robinson, 971 F. Supp. 244, 249 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (holding that the “All Writs
Act is not a jurisdictional blank check” for removal, but can only be used for exceptional
circumstances); In re Successor Liab. Claims Against Bairnco Corp., 837 F. Supp. 176, 177 (S.D.
W. Va. 1993) (holding that “the All Writs Act is not a source of federal question jurisdiction”).
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court.15 Yet, despite the widespread acceptance of using § 1651a as an
independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, the procedural
maneuver was of relatively recent vintage. The All Writs Act dates back
to the First Judiciary Act of 1789, but it was not until 1988 that the
Second Circuit, in Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers,16 first
approved the use of the All Writs Act to remove an otherwise
unremovable case.
The next case to approve an All Writs Act removal—and, in fact,
the decision that was cited by other courts far more often than Yonkers
as supporting prior precedent17—was also a Second Circuit decision.18
Notably, this decision was part of the same sprawling Agent Orange
litigation that produced the appeal in Stephenson a decade later. This
marks the most patent connection between the Sygnenta and Stephenson
cases: it was the Second Circuit’s decision in Ivy/Hartman II that blazed
the precedential trail authorizing the expanded use of the All Writs Act
as an independent basis of removal authority, a trail that ultimately was
cut short by the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Syngenta. It
also bears noting that the All Writs Act removal question also arose
directly in the appeal in Stephenson, insofar as one of the two cases
consolidated in the Stephenson appeal (the Issacson case) was only
removed to federal court—despite the absence of complete diversity or a

15. See Bylinski v. City of Allen Park, 169 F.3d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
removal is proper under the All Writs Act), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1037 (1999); NAACP v. Metro.
Council, 144 F.3d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Metropolitan Council II] (same), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998); NAACP v. Metro. Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Metropolitan Council I] (same), vacated by 522 U.S. 1145, and aff’d by Metropolitan
Council II, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998); In re VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir.
1996) (same); Sable v. Gen. Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d, 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993) (same) [hereinafter Agent Orange
II]; United States v. City of New York, 972 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Yonkers Racing
Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 865 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); N.Y. State Laborers Political
Action Comm. v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council, No. 97-CV-1731, 1998 WL 146248, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1998) (same); Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (same); Chance v. Sullivan, 993 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Atlantic Coast
Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 988 F. Supp. 486, 492 (D.N.J. 1997)
(same); Harbor Venture, Inc. v. Nichols, 934 F. Supp. 322, 324 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (same); Holmes v.
Trustmark Nat’l Bank, No. CIV.A. 195CV 323 GR, 1996 WL 904513, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 11,
1996) (same); Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., Nos. 93-1683, 94-2391 & 94-3087, 1994 WL 507801,
at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 1994) (same); Neuman v. Goldberg, 159 B.R. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(same); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Nowling v. Aero
Servs. Int’l., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 733, 738 (E.D. La. 1990) (same).
16. 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1988).
17. See Hoffman, supra note 13 (listing cases that relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in
Agent Orange).
18. See Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir 1993).
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federal question appearing on the face of the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded
complaint—on the assertion that the federal district judge that approved
the Agent Orange class action settlement retained residual authority
under the All Writs Act to remove any case that threatened to interfere
with the judgment approving that settlement. While the Court’s terse
per curiam opinion in Stephenson said nothing of substance on the issue
for which certiorari was granted, it did remand the consolidated
Isaacson case to state court in light of its previous decision in
Syngenta.19
Prior to the Supreme Court’s nullification of the practice in
Syngenta, courts that had relied on the All Writs Act to uphold a
defendant’s removal of an otherwise unremovable case had done so
either because a prior federal judgment was found to be preclusive of
subsequently filed state claims or because a subsequently filed suit
allegedly threatened to interfere with a prior federal judgment or
ongoing federal proceedings.20 Henson was an example of the former:
the district court in the Southern District of Alabama upheld the removal
of the state court action filed in Iberville Parish, Louisiana, after
concluding that it was precluded by a settlement previously approved by
the federal district court in related proceedings. To justify removal,
proponents would argue that the All Writs Act provided the independent
basis of subject matter jurisdiction.
The main difficulty with the argument that the All Writs Act,
standing alone, could serve as an independent basis of subject matter
jurisdiction is that it ran contrary to a well-established and long line of
precedents that the All Writs Act could not serve as an independent basis
of original subject matter jurisdiction.21 The lack of original jurisdiction

19. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111, 111 (2003) (“With respect to
respondents Joe Isaacson and Phyllis Lisa Isaacson, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of
Syngenta . . . .”).
20. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 19.
21. See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534-35 (1999). “While the All Writs Act
authorizes employment of extraordinary writs, . . . the express terms of the Act confine the power of
the CAAF to issuing process ‘in aid of’ its existing statutory jurisdiction; the Act does not enlarge
that jurisdiction.” Id. Furthermore, § 1651(a) may be used only for “filling the interstices of federal
judicial power when those gaps threatened to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts’
jurisdiction.” Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41 (1985).
It has been too frequently decided in this court to require the citation of cases that the
circuit courts of the United States have no jurisdiction in original cases of mandamus,
and have only power to issue such writs in aid of their jurisdiction in cases already
pending, wherein jurisdiction has been acquired by other means and by other process.
Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U.S. 109, 110 (1906).
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based solely on the All Writs Act was a significant problem for
proponents of removal under the statute since in the general removal
provision, 28 U.S.C. §1441, Congress has authorized removal only of
civil actions of which the federal court would have had “original
jurisdiction” had suit been initiated there.22 And while it is certainly true
that Congress can decide to authorize removal without conferring
original jurisdiction on the federal courts (indeed, it has done so on
several occasions23), there is no indication that Congress has done so in
the All Writs Act. Ultimately, it was this absence of original jurisdiction
and the Court’s willingness in its decision in Syngenta to defer to
Congress to define the scope of removal authority that formed the
principal ground on which the Court rejected reliance on the All Writs
Act to justify removal of an otherwise unremovable case.24
Unable to rely upon the statute as an independent source of original
jurisdiction and sensing, perhaps, the futility of trying to do so,
proponents of All Writs Act removal developed a second argument to
justify removal. They argued that § 1651a could be invoked to remove a
case even when an independent basis of original jurisdiction was lacking
so long as the court had previously possessed original jurisdiction in a
case and was now using the All Writs Act as an exercise of its “ancillary
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)
(“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to
federal court by the defendant.”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840 (1989) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) for the general proposition that “‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress, a case is not properly removed to federal court unless it might have been brought
there originally”).
23. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (allowing removal of civil or criminal suits and without regard
to whether the claims arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or the
diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 have been satisfied); 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (same); 28
U.S.C. § 1443 (allowing removal of an action seeking to enforce a right under any law providing for
equal civil rights); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n, 489 U.S. at 841 (holding state tax case against
Indian tribe was improperly removed where federal district court lacked original jurisdiction over
the case and observing: “[t]he jurisdictional question in this case is not affected by the fact that
tribal immunity is governed by federal law. . . . Congress has expressly provided by statute for
removal when it desired federal courts to adjudicate defenses based on federal immunities.”).
24. See Syngenta Crop Prod., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 29, 33 (2002) (noting that
“[b]ecause the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, it cannot confer the
original jurisdiction required to support removal pursuant to § 1441”). The Eleventh Circuit
similarly had rejected the defendants’ argument for relying exclusively on the All Writs Act to
justify removal, characterizing it as using the statute as “jurisdictional caulk” used to plug “the
cracks in federal jurisdiction through which crafty litigants can escape the effect of a federal order.”
Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir. 2001). Such an argument, even if
“tempting,” “goes too far,” the Eleventh Circuit ruled. Id. at 1071. “Too elastic an interpretation of
the All Writs Act perverts it from a tool for effectuating Congress’s intent in conferring jurisdiction
on the lower federal courts into a device for judically reequilibrating a state-federal balance that is
Congress’s to strike.” Id.
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jurisdiction” or “ancillary enforcement jurisdiction” to protect its
jurisdiction or prior judgment. This, in fact, was the central argument on
which Syngenta relied in its arguments before the United States Supreme
Court. It argued that since the federal court had original jurisdiction (on
the basis of diversity) to certify the class and approve the settlement
reached, it retained ancillary jurisdiction to remove the infringing state
case to protect and effectuate its judgment approving the class action
settlement.25 Syngenta noted that Judge Butler had included a clause in
the judgment expressly retaining jurisdiction, satisfying the predicate
from Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.26 As a result, they
argued, the district judge possessed jurisdiction ancillary to its original
jurisdiction over the case sufficient to support removal of the Henson
plaintiffs’ Louisiana case under the All Writs Act, even though there was
neither diversity between the parties nor a federal question appearing of
the face of the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint.27 Syngenta argued
that as long as the trial court included a retained jurisdiction clause in the
judgment, it possessed ancillary jurisdiction “to vindicate its authority
and effectuate its decrees,” which jurisdiction included the right to
remove the infringing state action pursuant to the All Writs Act.
C. Before the United States Supreme Court
While the ancilliary jurisdiction argument Syngenta advanced at the
Supreme Court enjoyed the concurrence of nearly every prior lower
court to consider the question, the justices wasted little time in oral
argument in expressing their skepticism for resort to the All Writs Act.28
25. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34 (distinguishing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511
U.S. 375 (1994)).
26. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
27. In Kokkonen, the Court had said that federal courts could exercise ancillary jurisdiction
either “to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,
factually interdependent,” or “to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379-80. The first occasion
for ancillary jurisdiction was inapplicable in Kokkonen, just as it was on the facts of the Syngenta
case, since the subsequent claims were brought in a separate action.
28. Consider the initial exchange at oral argument:
Mr. Alsobrook (counsel for petitioner): Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In
Kikkonen [sic] v. Guardian Life, this Court hypothesized the very situation that we
have before you this morning because here we have a nationwide class action
settlement where the court specifically by judgment retained jurisdiction to manage
the settlement as well as enforce it. A critical part of that settlement was the
dismissal of this case. However, when class counsel went to dismiss the case, as
the Eleventh Circuit pointed out and as the district court pointed out, his efforts
were thwarted and the case was not dismissed.
QUESTION [Rehnquist, C.J.]: Mr. Alsobrook, I see you’ve changed the question
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In the absence of original jurisdiction, the justices queried, how could
the Henson case have been removed under the All Writs Act, since the
All Writs Act does not, standing alone, provide an independent source of
original jurisdiction.29 Although Petitioner tried to argue that the federal
court could borrow from the original jurisdiction it possessed in Price,
the justices remained unconvinced that removal was appropriate where
original jurisdiction was lacking.30
The skepticism expressed at oral argument for allowing removal
under the All Writs Act of a case otherwise not within the district court’s
original jurisdiction carried over to the written decision in the case. On
behalf of a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the
attempt to justify removal under the All Writs Act. The All Writs Act
does not, “by its specific terms, provide federal courts with an
independent grant of jurisdiction,” Rehnquist intoned.31
Thus,
“[b]ecause the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts, it cannot confer the original jurisdiction required to support
removal pursuant to § 1441.”32 Moreover, the doctrine of ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction was equally unavailing because, as Rehnquist
noted, Defendants “fail to explain how the Alabama District Court’s
retention of jurisdiction over the Price settlement authorized removal of
the Henson action.”33 Removal “is governed by statute” and because no
statute authorized removal of the Henson plaintiffs’ state case, neither
invocation of the All Writs Act nor of a court’s “ancillary jurisdiction”
presented from the time in your certiorari petition to your opening brief. And the
question presented, when we granted, referred to 28 U.S.C., section 1441, and now
you have dropped your reference to that. Does that mean you’re abandoning
reliance on 1441 or simply broadening the question?
MR. ALSOBROOK: No, sir. We—we’re saying that under 1441 that because the district
court retained jurisdiction, that that was original jurisdiction to remove the matter,
and that actually, Your Honor, when we removed this, they—the majority of circuit
courts of appeals, namely the second, sixth, seventh, and eighth, had said that the
proper vehicle to remove this was the All Writs Act. And that is what we are
claiming today, as well as 28 U.S.C. 1367 ancillary jurisdiction, and we have set
that out in our brief.
QUESTION [Rehnquist, C.J.]: But you have no right to remove under 1441 because
there wasn’t complete diversity in the Louisiana suit. Isn’t that right?
MR. ALSOBROOK: That is correct.
QUESTION [Rehnquist, C.J.]: So you can’t rely on 1441 and that’s conceded.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at *3-4 (Oct. 15, 2002), Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537
U.S. 28 (2002) (No. 01-757), available at 2002 WL 31414640.
29. See id. at *7.
30. See generally id.
31. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 34.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 1
HOFFMAN3.DOC

616

5/14/2004 10:29 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:605

could validate its removal.34
Finally, and importantly, Rehnquist noted that the argument for
ancillary jurisdiction assumed that removal was “necessary” and
“appropriate,” as the language of § 1651a requires.35 Yet, even if Judge
Butler retained ancillary jurisdiction to enforce his judgment approving
the class action settlement, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to
invoke that power to remove the Henson case: “One in petitioners’
position may apply to the court that approved a settlement for an
injunction requiring dismissal of a rival action. Petitioners could also
have sought a determination from the Louisiana state court that
respondent’s action was barred by the judgment of the Alabama District
Court.”36
Because injunctive relief or the assertion of a preclusion defense
were two available alternatives to removal, and because Congress has
insisted that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in
order for it to be removed from a state court, the Court affirmed the
order of the Eleventh Circuit remanding the Henson case to state court.
D. The Defense of Preclusion and the Availability of Injunctive Relief
Rehnquist’s observation on the availability of seeking an injunction
or asserting a preclusion defense before the state court raises a
provocative question. That question, starkly posed, is this: if these other
options truly were available, why did the defendants choose, instead, to
remove the case? That the defendants had little interest in asking the
state judge to dismiss the case on res judicata is hardly surprising: they
may well have concluded that the forum, having been selected by the
plaintiff, may not have been the most receptive to its argument. Indeed,
any concern by the defendants that their arguments would fall on deaf
ears before the state judge certainly seems to have been validated by the
state judge’s willingness to allow the Henson plaintiffs to proceed with
the suit even after the federal settlement in Price. This does not explain,
however, why the defendants did not run to the federal district judge to
ask for an injunction instead of removing the case.
The likely answer is that once the option of All Writs Act removal
appeared viable, following the Second Circuit’s decisions in Yonkers and
Agent Orange, Syngenta’s lawyers, like many other defense counsel and
their clients, preferred removal over seeking injunctive relief for a host
34. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34.
35. Id. at 34 n.*.
36. Id.
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of strategic reasons. First, removal is automatic: you do not have to ask
permission to remove, and the burden is on the plaintiff to ask to remand
the case. In addition, the stay of state proceedings, following removal, is
similarly automatic. Unless and until a remand a granted, the state
proceedings remain in abeyance.37 There is also the added complication
of the papers to be filed in asking for an injunction and, on occasion, the
necessity of posting a bond. The paper requirements for removal are
comparatively less burdensome (and there is no statutory bond
requirement, of course, for removal). Finally, there are doctrinal
differences to consider, since the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,
has been interpreted as setting strict limitations on federal authority to
enjoin state proceedings. In her comprehensive work on the subject,38
Joan Steinman spoke with a number of the lawyers who had removed
cases on the basis of the All Writs Act and her summary of their remarks
confirms that these strategic considerations help explain the preference
for removal over injunctive relief:
Because it is “automatic,” the stay that attends a removal is not
proceeded by drama, contention and uncertainty over whether the court
should enter an inter-system injunction in the particular case, and the
parties avoid the effort and expense entailed by such contention.
While a motion to remand may generate contention, such contention
focuses on the propriety of the removal, rather than on the “softer”
equitable considerations that go into the decision whether to enjoin
other proceedings and on the notions of comity and federalism which
make federal courts wary of enjoining state court proceedings. . . .39

“So,” with all of these tactical advantages, Steinman summarized
rhetorically, “why seek to enjoin when removal is available?”40
Ultimately, of course, the Court in Syngenta rejected the
proposition that a litigant has an equal choice between removal and
seeking injunctive relief. Removal, entirely a creature of legislative
prerogative, depends (at least as far as a removal under § 1441 is
concerned) on the assumption that a basis of original jurisdiction exists
such that the state case could have been initially brought in federal court.
In the absence of a federal question on the face of the plaintiff’s wellpleaded complaint or diversity between the parties, the Southern District
of Alabama lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Henson case and,
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
38. See Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All
Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773, 812-13 (2000).
39. Id. at 813.
40. Id.
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therefore, was not removable.
Rehnquist’s opinion does recognize that Syngenta could choose
between asserting a preclusion defense before the state judge or asking
Judge Butler of the Southern District of Alabama to enjoin the Henson
plaintiffs from going forward with their state court claims. What the
opinion does not address, however, is whether injunctive relief or a
defense of preclusion is to be preferred in these circumstances. No
attempt was made to order that choice. Nor did the Court address
whether better justification for injunctive relief would exist as a result of
the practical problems (as seen from the defendant’s perspective) with
having to seek summary dismissal from the state court that had proven
receptive to the Henson plaintiffs’ claims. The most we can say is that
the Court in Syngenta was agnostic as to the choice between injunctive
relief or the assertion of a preclusion defense and unmindful of any of
the practical problems that might prompt a party to prefer one choice
over another.
* * *
So what did the defendants actually decide to do following the
Court’s decision in Syngenta? After the decision of the Court was
handed down (though, oddly, not immediately upon notification of that
decision), defendants petitioned Judge Butler for injunctive relief. For
several months, however, no action was taken by the district court on
that request.41 Equally inexplicable has been the lack of action taken by
the Henson plaintiffs in the state court. Neither before nor even after
injunctive relief was sought did plaintiffs seek to get the state judge to
rule that their suit was not barred by the prior federal settlement.42 The
failure to try to obtain a favorable ruling on the preclusive effect of the
federal judgment is especially difficult to comprehend, given the
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama
Bank.43
In Parsons Steel, the Court held that a state court’s
determination as to the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment
must, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, be given full faith and credit by federal
courts.44 Thus, if the Louisiana state court judge had ruled that the
Henson plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by the federal settlement
before an injunction issued, that determination would have been
41. See Civil Docket Sheet, Price v. Ciba-Geigy, Docket No. 94-cv-00647-CB .
42. See Civil Docket Sheet, Henson v. Ciba-Geigy, #43,620 (case filed 9/15/93) (reflecting no
activity since November 1998); see also notes of telephone interview with Iberville County court
clerk, December 3, 2003 (confirming same)(on file with author).
43. 474 U.S. 518 (1986).
44. Id. The state trial court’s judgment remains subject to direct review, of course.
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conclusive on the issue. On November 20, 2003, however, no such
ruling by the state court had been sought or made and Judge Butler
granted Syngenta’s request for an injunction.45
II. STEPHENSON
In one sense, it might be said that the Court in Stephenson picked
up where the decision in Syngenta left off. The federal judicial authority
to enjoin state collateral attacks on a prior federal judgment approving a
class action settlement is one aspect of the post-Syngenta problem of
defining, generally, the limits of federal injunctive power. Because a
majority of justices could not agree in Stephenson, we still do not know
where the Supreme Court will draw those boundaries. In the meantime,
then, we may approach the question left unanswered by Stephenson by
examining the Second Circuit’s opinion, along with the positions of the
parties and their amici before the Supreme Court. First, though, a quick
summary of the facts of the dispute is in order.46
A. Factual Prelude: The Agent Orange Litigation
Two Vietnam War veterans, Joe Isaacson and Daniel Stephenson,
brought separate actions alleging exposure to Agent Orange during the
Vietnam War. Their suits were filed, respectively, in August 1998 and
February 1999. These filing dates immediately raise several problems.
One might well ask, for instance, why veterans who fought during the
1960s only first brought suit more than a quarter century after their
wartime exposure. As provocative as this question might be,47
45. See Civil Docket Sheet, Price v. Ciba-Geigy, Docket No. 94-cv-00647-CB (injunctive
relief granted November 20, 2003).
46. Those interested in a more complete factual record may consult the appellate court’s
decision. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
47. I do not mean to suggest that plaintiffs lack good arguments to account for why their
claims are not time-barred. In this regard, the Second Circuit noted in its decision that Isaacson was
not diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lympohoma until 1996 and that Stephenson’s doctors first told
him he had bone marrow cancer in February 1998. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255. Additionally, as
respondents noted in their brief before the United States Supreme Court: “Under the law of their
home states, neither Isaacson, a citizen of New Jersey, nor Stephenson, a citizen of Louisiana, could
have brought a cancer claim against petitioners until he was actually diagnosed with cancer.” See
Brief for Respondents at *4, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271),
available at 2003 WL 193581. See also generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Futures Problem, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1907 (2000) (“[A] futures claimant is one who cannot be specifically
identified as being causally related to a specific potentially liable actor. Stated in epistemological
terms, a “futures” therefore is a hypothetical person. A hypothetical person cannot have real legal
rights or be owed real legal obligations. By the same token, a hypothetical person cannot be the
subject of a binding determination except through the concept of an in rem proceeding.”). The main

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 1
HOFFMAN3.DOC

620

5/14/2004 10:29 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:605

defendants never had to raise this argument because of a second aspect
of the problem raised by these late filing dates, a problem, we may note,
that is reminiscent of the procedural problem the Henson plaintiffs faced
in Syngenta.
For those who are familiar with the long history of the Agent
Orange litigation in the United States, the filing of any lawsuit after
1994 will bring to mind the settlement approved by United States
District Judge Jack Weinstein purporting to bar recovery for any suits
filed after December 31, 1994. As the Second Circuit noted in its
decision, in 1984 “virtually identical claims against these defendants
[were] brought by a class of military personnel who were exposed to
Agent Orange while in Vietnam between 1961 and 1972.”48 The class
certified by Judge Weinstein in 1984 purported to include, inter alia, any
persons in the United States Armed Forces “at any time from 1961 to
1972 who were injured while in or near Vietnam by exposure to Agent
Orange,” and listed as members, all “spouses, parents and children of the
veterans born before January 1, 1984” who were “directly or
derivatively injured as a result of the exposure.”49 Notice was sent
advising that persons who wished to opt out must do so by May 1, 1984.
Thereafter, the named plaintiffs, acting on behalf of all persons who had
not opted out (and Stephenson and Issacson had certainly not opted out),
reached a settlement of all claims against the manufacturers of Agent
Orange. The Agent Orange settlement, which disposed of these
“virtually identical claims” that Stephenson and Isaacson subsequently
brought fourteen years later, formed the basis for defendants’ assertion
that Stephenson’s and Isaacson’s claims were barred.
B. Of Apples and Second Bites: Comparing Syngenta and Stephenson
On its face, these facts suggest an analogy between the attempt by
the Henson plaintiffs to seek additional relief against Syngenta,
following the global settlement reached in the federal class action
proceeding in the Price litigation, and the attempt by Stephenson and
Isaacson to seek recovery against the Agent Orange manufacturers years
after the global settlement Judge Weinstein approved. Indeed, if passage
of time were the only consideration, it would be much harder to justify

point I am making here is that the question of whether these claims were time-barred was never
reached because defendants relied, instead, on a logically precedent preclusion defense, as discussed
below.
48. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 251.
49. Id. at 252.
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allowing the Stephenson and Isaacson claims to be brought, nearly a
decade and a half after the Agent Orange settlement, as compared with
the relatively brief interval that passed between the time the Price
settlement was concluded and the Henson plaintiffs reasserted their
claims in Iberville Parish, Louisiana. These patent similarities mask
important differences between the cases, however.
One key difference between the state plaintiffs in Syngenta and the
Stephenson and Isaacson plaintiffs in Stephenson is that the former were
parties to the global settlement reached and approved by the federal
court (recall that they actually intervened into that litigation). They also
voluntarily compromised their claims against the chemical company in
exchange for some monetary payment that they actually received. Not
so with Messrs. Stephenson and Isaacson. Neither had received any
portion of the global Agent Orange settlement fund to compensate them
for their injuries. And, while defendants argued that Stephenson and
Isaacson were absent members of the certified class and, therefore,
bound by that settlement where they did not opt out of the class, whether
these absent class members were barred by the actions of the named
plaintiffs was precisely the question on which the Court granted
certiorari in Stephenson. That is, from the plaintiffs’ perspective in
Stephenson, the difference between Henson and the other plaintiffs who
voluntarily intervened in Syngenta is that Messrs. Stephenson and
Isaacson did not participate in the 1984 case in Judge Weinstein’s court,
likely received no notice that there even was a case against the
manufacturers of Agent Orange, and would probably have not paid
attention to the notice if they had received it since at the time they had
not been diagnosed with any illness or condition.50 In other words,
Stephenson and Isaacson questioned how they could be bound to a
judgment approving a settlement in which they did not participate and
from which they were not to receive any share of the proceeds, based
solely on the determination of the certifying court that they were
adequately represented by those who did.
It should be noted that there had been attempts by other plaintiffs,
after 1984, to bring additional claims against the Agent Orange
manufacturers.51 All of these earlier cases, however, had been brought
50. Cf. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (noting that giving
effective notice is likely not possible to exposure-only class members).
51. The most prominent of these cases were the two class actions originally filed in Texas
state court: Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. and Hartman v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemicals Co. These were the cases subsequently removed under the All Writs Act that eventually
led the Second Circuit to affirm the validity of invoking the All Writs Act to remove a case
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by plaintiffs who had manifested injury before 1994. Consequently, all
earlier claimants had been entitled to at least some share in the Agent
Orange settlement, a fact that carried considerable significance in the
Second Circuit’s decision to uphold Judge Weinstein’s adequacy
determinations as to these plaintiffs.52 By contrast, the Isaacson and
Stephenson cases, brought by and on behalf of claimants who alleged
that their injuries manifested after 1994, directly posed the question of
whether the named class members in Agent Orange had adequately
represented those members of the class whose injuries did not become
cognizable until after the settlement fund had been depleted.
C. Stephenson and Isaacson in the Lower Courts
1. Judge Weinstein Dismisses both Claims
Stephenson’s and Isaacson’s argument that they were not parties to
the earlier proceeding and, therefore, not bound by that judgment fell on
deaf ears at the district court level. Judge Weinstein, to whom both
cases had been transferred,53 dismissed their claims, concluding that the
prior Agent Orange settlement proscribed them from seeking recovery
since it barred recovery by any plaintiffs after 1994.
2. The Second Circuit’s Reversal
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the prior
settlement did not preclude Stephenson and Isaacson from asserting
claims for injuries sustained by their exposure to Agent Orange. Several
aspects of its opinion are worth highlighting.
a. All Writs Act Removal Upheld
First, the appellate court found that even though there was neither
diversity between the parties nor a federal question in Isaacson, the case
otherwise not within the district court’s original jurisdiction. See Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425
(2d. Cir 1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
52. See Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d at 1435-36; see also Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 n.7
(noting that the Agent Orange II court’s conclusion that pre-1994 claimants were adequately
represented in the prior Agent Orange litigation “was based, at least in part, on those claimants’
eligibility for compensation from the settlement fund”).
53. Isaacson, begun in New Jersey state court, was removed to federal court (on the authority
of the All Writs Act) and then transferred to Judge Weinstein by the MDL panel under 28 U.S.C. §
1407. Stephenson was filed in the Western Distirct of Louisiana and subsequently transferred by
the MDL panel to Judge Weinstein and consolidated with Isaacson. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at
255-56.
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was properly removed under the All Writs Act because the case raised
the question of the preclusive effect of the previous Agent Orange
settlement. After Syngenta, it is clear that this portion of the appellate
court’s decision is no longer good law. It is worth pausing to reflect,
however, on the absence of any meaningful consideration by the Second
Circuit of why alternatives to removal were not adequate to determine
the preclusive effect of Judge Weinstein’s 1984 Agent Orange judgment.
The Second Circuit did not address why the preclusion question could
not be handled by the New Jersey state court judge presiding over the
Isaacson case and/or even by Judge Weinstein himself through
consideration of whether to enjoin Isaacson from litigating his claims in
New Jersey. Instead, the appellate court summarily noted that “the court
‘best situated to make this determination’ is the court that entered
judgment.”54
One explanation, perhaps, for the approach taken by the circuit
court may be simply that the court thought consideration of these
alternatives unnecessary, given the availability of removal under the All
Writs Act. Yet, given what was said earlier about Rehnquist’s
unwillingness in Syngenta to explicate the role of preclusion law and/or
the availability of injunctive relief to deal with threatening state
litigation, the Second Circuit’s ready resort to All Writs Act removal
probably also reflects the uncertainty felt among the lower courts (and,
by extension, litigants) as to the proper mechanisms for protecting prior
federal judgments or a federal judge’s continuing jurisdiction in a case.
Additionally, as I will argue in Part III, given the narrow scope of the
Court’s opinion in Syngenta and the lack of a majority opinion in
Stephenson, it appears that the uncertainty over the scope of the federal
judicial injunctive power will continue.
b. Right to Collateral Attack Upheld
After allowing removal of the Isaacson case under the All Writs
Act, the Second Circuit turned to the central question on appeal: namely,
whether the plaintiffs’ state claims were barred by the prior Agent
Orange judgment. The appellate court dissected the question into two
steps. The court first considered whether plaintiffs could bring a
collateral attack against that judgment or whether, as defendants argued,
such an attack was barred because Judge Weinstein had already
considered and “extensively litigated” their rights in the prior
54. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257 (quoting its earlier decision in Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d at
1431).
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litigation.55 Assuming a right to collaterally attack the judgment, the
second step then was to consider whether the named plaintiffs in 1984
had been adequate representatives of futures plaintiffs.
The tricky part to the first step of the analysis was that whether
Stephenson, Isaacson and all other post-1994 unnamed class claimants
could collaterally attack the 1984 judgment depended on whether they
were regarded as parties in that prior litigation. If the named plaintiffs
were not adequate representatives of the future claimants, then Messrs.
Stephenson and Isaacson and other similarly situated persons would not
be bound by Judge Weinstein’s prior judgment. As the Second Circuit
succinctly put it: “If plaintiffs were not proper parties to that
judgment . . . res judicata cannot defeat their claims.”56 In non-class
litigation, the question of who is a party and, therefore, bound to a
judgment is usually uncomplicated; typically, all that must be done is to
consider whether the person (or entity) was properly served or otherwise
appeared in the case. The class action context complicates the analysis,
however: whether one is a “party” plaintiff to a class action proceeding
turns on whether he or she is adequately represented by the named class
plaintiffs. As the Supreme Court famously observed in Hansberry v.
Lee, in a passage that is worth quoting at length:
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has
not been made a party by service of process . . . . To these general rules
there is a recognized exception that, to an extent not precisely defined
by judicial opinion, the judgment in a “class” or “representative” suit,
to which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of
the class or those represented who were not made parties to it . . . . The
class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree
in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the
litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the
usual rules of procedure is impracticable . . . . In such cases where the
interests of those not joined are of the same class as the interests of
those who are, and where it is considered that the latter fairly represent
the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all
have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree.57

In judging whether the interests of those not joined are of the same
class as those who are, the Court subsequently ruled in Phillips
55. Id.
56. Id. at 259.
57. 311 U.S. 32, 40-42 (1940).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/1

20

Hoffman: Federal Judicial Injunctive Power
HOFFMAN3.DOC

2004]

5/14/2004 10:29 AM

FEDERAL JUDICIAL INJUNCTIVE POWER

625

Petroleum v. Shutts58 that “the Due Process Clause of course requires
that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of
absent class members.”59
The “at all times” language of Shutts remains a source of debate
among some commentators60 and was squarely at issue in the
Stephenson appeal.61 The Second Circuit in Stephenson, however,
squarely accepted the notion that adequacy is not to be judged
exclusively by the rendering court but may be questioned collaterally. In
particular, the panel opinion noted that plaintiffs could bring a collateral
attack on the 1984 judgment for two reasons. Judge Weinstein had
made no determination about adequacy of representation as to claimants,
such as these plaintiffs, who manifested injury after 1994.62 Moreover,
the appellate court noted, citing several lower court opinions (though,
somewhat curiously, neither Hansberry nor Shutts), whether class
representatives adequately represent the class can only be determined by
considering both the validity of the trial court’s determination at the
certification stage and whether, after the lawsuit is over, the class
representatives were, in fact, adequate representatives of the interests of

58. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
59. Id. at 812.
60. Compare Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State
Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 264
(rejecting the idea that the adequacy determination may be collaterally attacked and arguing that “as
long as the court entertaining a proposed class action affords class members fair opportunity to raise
the issue, adequacy of representation should be raised directly, and not be permitted to be raised
collaterally”) with Monaghan, supra note 11, at 1197 (arguing that “adequate representation, not
simply adequate procedures, must exist at all times” and critiquing Kahan and Silberman’s
interpretation of the relevant authorities). See Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack
for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383 (2000). Richard Nagareda has
recently entered the debate on the side of those seeking to limit collateral review of class judgments
by arguing that “commentators have made too much of the reference to the adequacy of class
representation ‘at all times.’”
Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 315 (2003) (arguing that “a conception of class representation
grounded in administrative law—specifically, its structures for accountability and its demand for
reasoned explanation as a check upon arbitrariness—can generate the desperately needed
supplement to conventional preclusion analysis for class judgments”).
61. Indeed, reflective of the leading work that these legal scholars have undertaken in this
debate, the briefs of petitioners and respondents (and their respective amici) also divide in their
treatment of the available academic commentary. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners at 28, Dow Chem.
Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at 2002 WL 31914663 (citing, inter
alia, Kahan and Silberman, supra note 60); Brief of Respondents, supra note 47, at 26 (citing, inter
alia, Woolley, supra note 60).
62. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257-58 (observing that “neither this Court nor the district court
has addressed specifically the adequacy of representation for those members of the class whose
injuries manifested after depletion of the settlement funds”).
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the class.63 This conclusion, the Second Circuit also noted, was
consistent with the maxim that “a court adjudicating a dispute cannot
predetermine the res judicata effect of its own judgment.”64
c. Named Plaintiffs in 1984 were Inadequate Representatives
of Futures Plaintiffs
Having disposed of the first line of defense offered by defendants—
that plaintiffs had no right to collaterally attack the prior judgment—the
appellate court then reached the second step which, specifically, required
an evaluation of whether the named class members in 1984 were
adequate representatives of post-1994 claimants such as Stephenson and
Isaacson.
The Second Circuit found the named class members not to have
been adequate representatives of the post-1994 claimants. The principal
basis for the court’s conclusion that the named plaintiffs were not
adequate representatives was the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.65 The Second Circuit
reasoned that although Messrs. Stephenson and Isaacson both fell within
the class definition in the Agent Orange litigation—both served in the
United States military in Vietnam between 1961 and 1972 and allege to
have been exposed to Agent Orange while on their tour of duty there—
there was an inherent conflict between their interests (as futures
plaintiffs) and those of the named class members who sought immediate
recompense for their present injuries.66 As a result of this inherent
conflict, Stephenson and Isaacson could not have been adequately
represented in the prior Agent Orange litigation under Amchem.

63. Id. at 258-59 (citing Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973)). One possible
explanation for the Second Circuit’s decision to cite neither Hansberry nor Shutts is that, strictly
speaking, both decisions only addressed the due process limits under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Illinois and Kansas courts, respectively. The question before the
Second Circuit in Stephenson concerned the preclusive effect of a federal judgment, namely the
federal judgment by Weinstein approving the Agent Orange class certification and settlement in
1984, as limited by the Fifth Amendment. Compare Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 69 (noting that “[t]he
question in this appeal is whether plaintiff-appellant Gonzales and the class he seeks to represent are
bound by the res judicata effect of a prior class suit”). That prior class suit was brought in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
64. Id. at 258 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985)).
65. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
66. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/1

22

Hoffman: Federal Judicial Injunctive Power
HOFFMAN3.DOC

2004]

5/14/2004 10:29 AM

FEDERAL JUDICIAL INJUNCTIVE POWER

627

D. Before the United States Supreme Court
1. Petitioners Emphasized Policy Consequences of Allowing
Collateral Attacks
Before the United States Supreme Court, petitioners focused their
arguments for reversing the Second Circuit on the policy implications of
a rule permitting collateral attacks. They argued that in allowing the
plaintiffs’ state suits to proceed the Second Circuit approved a broad
collateral attack rule that threatened the finality of all class action
determinations. The result sanctioned by the appellate court, they
argued, would disrupt class actions in the future and, potentially, even
those previously settled.67 The specter petitioners painted was of absent
class members rising up en masse to announce their dissatisfaction with
class action settlements, without any time constraint as to when such
attacks could be brought. Nor, they noted, would there be any limit to
the number of attacks that could be brought: even if one attack is
successfully resisted, nothing in the Second Circuit’s broad rule would
preclude another nonparticipating class member from asserting another
challenge, in a different forum.68 All of these policy considerations,
petitioners and their amici urged, would “seriously interfere with
litigants’ incentives to settle class action disputes.”69 As one amicus
brief for petitioners put it:
Why would any rational defendant agree to settle if it cannot achieve
peace and repose with respect to the entire class? At the very least, the
risk that a class settlement might be disturbed, years later, by a nowsilent class member will substantially discourage defendants from
entering into any class settlement.70

As a secondary position, petitioners and their amici argued that if
the Court were to allow some form of collateral attack, it should limit its
scope. According to petitioners, the second court could retain a
collateral review role without having the broad, de novo review
contemplated by the Second Circuit. Where the Second Circuit regarded
collateral review as appropriately allowing a second court to determine
whether conditions exist that justify granting finality to the first
67. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 61, at 39-40.
68. Id.
69. See Brief of the Products Liability Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 11, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at
2002 WL 31886886 [hereinafter Brief of amicus curiae PLAC].
70. Id.
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judgment, petitioners and their amici argued that any collateral review
allowed should be limited so that the second court would only review the
adequacy of the procedures taken by the certifying court. Under this
view, so long as the certifying court “ensure[s] that class counsel
diligently represents the class, and that the representative’s interests do
not substantially conflict with those of other class members,” there
would be no grounds for collaterally attacking the adequacy
determination.71 Undergirding their position was an assumption, of
course, that a federal court’s obligation to oversee the procedures in
certifying a class under Rule 23 is sufficiently protective of the interests
of absent class members so as to justify according finality to its
judgment when the court properly carries out its obligations.72
Most broadly, petitioners and their amici argued that while
according the right to collateral attack may be a worthwhile goal in the
abstract, a larger and more pressing value is the social interest in
resolving complex litigation.
The broad collateral attack right
authorized by the Second Circuit would be inconsistent with res judicata
principles, petitioners argued, as they pertain to finality of judgments.
As a result, the social interest in resolving complex litigation would be
stymied. Instead, according to petitioners and their amici, finality
should be given to the certifying court so long as class members received
adequate notice and the court provided a full and fair opportunity for
class members to raise objections to the adequacy of representation by
the class representatives.73
2. Respondents Focused on Specific Facts of the Two Cases
In their brief and in oral argument before the high court,
respondents emphasized most centrally the specific facts of the
Stephenson and Isaacson cases.74 This strategy was clearly driven by a
belief that the specific facts of the two cases were egregious enough that
the Court would be likely to permit these collateral attacks, even if there
was unwillingness to approve a broader right to maintain collateral
attacks in other cases. Of course, respondents also urged the Court to
affirm the Second Circuit’s decision insofar as it recognized a broad
71. Id. at 23.
72. See id. at 25 (asserting that “[a] broad collateral attack rule is not necessary to provide
adequate protection for absent class members interests”).
73. See id. at 12 (arguing that the “certifying court’s adequacy of representation determination
should be final and conclusive as to all class members” assuming notice and a full and fair
opportunity to raise objections is given).
74. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 47, at 1.
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right of collateral attack where named class representatives were
inadequate representatives,75 but their written brief contains an unusually
large portion of the allotted pages devoted to highlighting the specific
factual background involved in the Stephenson and Isaacson suits and
why these facts warranted allowing these particular plaintiffs to proceed
with their claims.76
3. Amici for Respondent Focused on Broader Policy Implications
While respondents tethered most of their arguments to the facts of
the two cases, amici for respondents argued more broadly for the Court
to affirm the Second Circuit’s decision allowing collateral attacks.
Arguments made by several amici focused more heavily on the practical
realities of class litigation where collateral attacks are a rare but
important deterrent to collusive conduct in the class action arena.
Several briefs noted that the availability of collateral review better
ensures the nonparticipating class members are treated fairly.77
Furthermore, other amici argued that in questioning the right to
bring a collateral attack it was petitioners who were seeking to unsettle
established law.78 The traditional and well-established rule, they
observed, is that persons who do not participate in a legal proceeding
may challenge through collateral attack in a subsequent proceeding the
power of the initial court to bind it to judgment. This traditional rule is
based on principles of due process the Court had recognized for well
over a century. Several briefs noted, for instance, that the Court had
ruled on numerous occasions—including seminal decisions like
Pennoyer v. Neff and Hansberry v. Lee—that one is not bound to a
75. The argument portion of their brief followed the basic two-step structure employed by the
Second Circuit, arguing, first, that nonparticipating class members may always raise due process
objections in actions brought subsequent to the judgment of the certifying court; and, secondly, that
they received neither adequate notice nor representation in the 1984 Agent Orange settlement. It
was on the latter point, however, that respondents focused the majority of their written argument.
76. Also, it would be incorrect to say that respondents gave no attention to broader policy
considerations in the case. For instance, respondents concluded their brief by reminding the Court
that the philosophical debate between respecting an individual litigant’s right to adjudicate their
claims and the systemic need for finality has been addressed in the class action context by the Court
on several prior occasions and that on each occasion the Court has recognized that however
compelling “finality” may be, necessary exceptions must be carved out and protected. See Brief of
Respondents, supra note 47, at 43.
77. See, e.g., Brief of amicus curiae Public Citizen at 16, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539
U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at 2003 WL 193571 (arguing that “collateral review is
necessary to prevent the abuse of class members’ rights”).
78. See Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors at 1, 6-7, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539
U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at 2003 WL 193562.
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judgment unless they have either been properly served with process or
have consented to suit in the forum.79 Thus, under the traditional rule,
persons not formally made parties to a proceeding are not bound by it.80
Yet, these amici argued, whether absent class members are parties to a
class proceeding depends on whether the named class plaintiffs are
adequate representatives of their interests and whether named
representatives are in fact adequate representatives can only be ensured
if de novo collateral reviews are allowed. By contrast, petitioners’ rule
assumes that absent class members are justified in relying on the
certifying court and on defendants to ensure that their interests are
protected. As a practical matter, however, this is unlikely to occur.
Neither the presence of objectors, nor the named defendants can cure
defects of inadequate class representatives, respondents’ amici argued.81
Additionally and relatedly, amici for respondents parried
petitioners’ assertion that affirming the Second Circuit would create
disincentives to settling class litigation and would be disruptive of class
action procedure by noting that class actions are routinely brought and
settled today, even as a right to collateral attack is broadly recognized.82
Furthermore, the policy costs of disallowing collateral attack favor
rejecting petitioners’ position, amici for respondents argued. If
petitioners’ position were adopted, they argued that absent class
members would have to monitor every class action filed and decide
whether the amount they have at stake justifies intervention.83 Since
most of the time individual class members will have only a very small
personal stake in the litigation, the occasions which will warrant
intervention into the case will be infrequent. Additionally, disallowing
de novo collateral review of the certifying court’s adequacy
determination would create incentives for collusion between counsel for
the named plaintiffs and defendants.84
Finally, several amici concluded by reminding the Court that while
petitioners tried to suggest that the need for finality is what prompted the
rule makers to allow for class procedures that will bind nonparticipating
79. See id. at 8; see also Brief of amicus curiae Public Citizen, supra note 77, at 13-14.
80. See Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors, supra note 78, at 8.
81. Id. at 14-15.
82. Id. at 16. Even in the Ninth Circuit, where Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir.
1999) (Epstein III), is regarded as the lone circuit court decision restricting collateral attacks on a
certifying court’s judgment, subsequent cases call into question the Epstein III court’s view of
collateral attack. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 914 (2001). For more on Epstein III, see infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
83. See Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors, supra note 78, at 16.
84. See Brief of amicus curiae Public Citizen, supra note 77, at 18.
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and unnamed class members, Rule 23 does not demand that the principle
of finality be accepted, unconditionally, as the paramount goal. Where
due process rights have been abridged, they urged, finality must yield.
III. IN THE AFTERMATH
In the aftermath of the decision in Syngenta and the non-decision in
Stephenson, there are a number of questions that remain to be addressed
concerning the scope of the federal judicial injunctive power.
A. Looking Beyond Stephenson
In the class action arena, the four-four split in Stephenson leaves the
question on which the Court granted certiorari ripe for reconsideration.
The Court previously skirted the collateral attack issue in Matsushita
Electrical Industries Co. v. Epstein.85 While some commentators regard
the Court’s decision in Matsushita as implicitly restrictive of the right to
collaterally attack the certifying court’s adequacy determination,86 most
seem to recognize the Court did not address the point.87 While the nondecision in Stephenson lacks precedential value, the case advances the
debate beyond Matsushita: that a plurality of justices were apparently
85. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
[R]espondents contend that the settlement proceedings did not satisfy due process
because the class was inadequately represented. Respondents make this claim in spite of
the Chancery Court’s express ruling, following argument on the issue, that the class
representatives fairly and adequately protected the interests of the class. We need not
address the due process claim, however, because it is outside the scope of the question
presented in this Court.
Id. at 379 n.5 (citations omitted).
86. Two of the leading expositors of this view are Professors Silberman and Kahan, who
argue that “the Supreme Court’s rejection of an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Statute for
the federal claims at issue ‘must be read, at least in part, as a rejection of the Epstein plaintiffs’
argument . . . that because class counsel could not litigate the exclusive federal claims, they could
not adequately represent the class for the purposes of settling those claims.” See Marcel Kahan &
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v.
MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 790 (1998). See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Full Faith and Credit
to Settlements in Overlapping Class Actions: A Reply to Professors Kahan and Silberman, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1174 (1998).
87. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an
Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1051 (2003) (“The Supreme Court’s affirmance of claim
preclusion following the steps taken by the trial judge may be taken as an endorsement of strong
judicial management in the class context, but it should not be read as approving the principle that a
hearing by the class judge on the issue of adequacy forecloses challenges in F2.”); Woolley, supra
note 60, at 416-18 and esp. n.137. Even Richard Nagareda, an opponent of collateral challenges to
adequacy, recognizes that in Matsushita “the Court itself explicitly declined to address the adequate
representation issue on the ground that it lay outside the question presented on appeal.” Nagareda,
supra note 60, at 344.
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willing to reverse the Second Circuit, even on the extreme facts on this
particular case, suggests that it would be a mistake in the aftermath of
Stephenson to ignore the very real possibility that the right to collateral
attack may itself be under attack.
I certainly do not mean to overstate the point. The traditional rule
recognizing the right of absent class members to collaterally attack the
judgment of the certifying court on due process grounds is accepted,
virtually without dissent88 among courts and commentators.89
Nonetheless, one suspects that the willingness of four justices in
Stephenson to reverse the Second Circuit is likely to encourage
arguments similar to those advanced by petitioners in the case, for either
no review or only a minimal level of review. The Ninth Circuit’s panel
decision in Epstein III, which is regarded—perhaps dubiously90—as
restricting an absent class member’s right to collaterally attack a
certifying court’s adequacy determination, is likely to be a more closely
considered precedent in future class action litigation as it is invoked by
those seeking to narrow the scope of collateral review of class
judgments. No doubt the continued expansion of class action dockets in
state and federal court will provide plenty of opportunities for
reconsideration of the collateral review question.
Consider one prominent, recent example. In 2002, a federal district
judge in Indianapolis certified a nationwide class covering multiple
88. The leading judicial dissent is the second panel opinion in Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d
641 (9th Cir. 1999). Several prominent academic commentators have similarly argued against a de
novo collateral attack rule. See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 86; Linda Silberman, The
Vicissitudes of the American Class Action – With A Comparative Eye, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
201 (1999).
89. See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
4455, at 484-87 (2002). Traditional acceptance of the right to collateral attack was not only
recognized by respondents and their amici in Stephenson, it was also even acknowledged, at least in
part, by one amicus brief for petitioners. See Brief of amicus curiae PLAC, supra note 69, at 18
n.13 (conceding that “application of the ‘jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction’ concept ordinarily
presupposes the actual presence of the party to be bound in the initial proceeding–an element
obviously lacking when applied to absent class members who make no appearance before the
certifying court” (citation omitted)).
90. In its initial opinion, the panel ruled 2-1, per Judges Norris and Wiggins, that plaintiffs
were inadequately represented in the original class proceeding and could collaterally attack the
judgment on that basis. Judge O’Scannlain dissented. After Norris retired (days later), defendants
filed a motion for rehearing and, on rehearing, the new panel ruled, again, 2-1, that no collateral
attack could be brought. The new opinion was written by Judge O’Scannlain and he was joined by
Judge Wiggins, who did an about face. Judge Thomas, who replaced Norris, dissented. Thus, the
Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Stephenson notes, “putting aside Judge Wiggins’ two votes as
cancelling themselves out, one judge, Judge O’Scannlain, voted for the no collateral attack of
adequacy rule, and two judges of the Ninth Circuit voted against it.” See Law Professors’ Brief,
supra note 78, at 6 n.6.
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models of Ford vehicles and Firestone tires sold between 1990 and 2001.
The class was made up of owners of more than 60 million tires and three
million cars.91 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the district
court had abused its discretion in certifying a nationwide class, finding,
inter alia, that too many different state laws would have to be applied in
the case.92 Unhappy with the decision by the intermediate court of
appeals, the same lawyers filed new suits in a number of different state
courts, seeking nationwide class certification in at least five of these
cases. Ford and Firestone then returned to the federal district judge in
Indianapolis and asked her to enforce the Seventh Circuit’s ruling by
enjoining the plaintiffs and their counsel from filing any other class
actions. Notably, the relief Ford and Firestone sought was an order
foreclosing the filing of any further class litigation in state court,
including even any attempt at statewide class certification. The district
judge denied the motion and the defendants again appealed to the
Seventh Circuit.93
This is where the story takes an interesting twist. On the second
go-round, the Seventh Circuit ruled partially in favor of plaintiffs and
partially in favor of the defendants. Judge Easterbrook first concluded
that plaintiffs and their counsel were free to attempt to certify plaintiff
classes on a statewide basis, as the Seventh Circuit’s earlier opinion
spoke only to the impropriety of certifying a nationwide class.94 The
panel ultimately held, however, that Ford and Firestone were entitled to
an injunction precluding all members of the putative national class and
their lawyers from seeking nationwide class certification in any other
state court.95 While recognizing that “[n]ormally” the preclusive effect
of a judgment is to be determined by a second court, not by the court
rendering the judgment, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that
exceptional circumstances may warrant the issuance of injunctive relief
to prevent multiple state courts from opining on the preclusive effect of
the appellate court’s earlier opinion reversing the district judge’s
nationwide certification order. Describing the efforts of plaintiffs and
91. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
92. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
93. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003)
[Bridgestone/Firestone II].
94. Id. at 766, 769.
95. Id. at 769 (ruling that the district judge must enforce its earlier judgment “by issuing an
injunction that prevents all members of the putative national classes, and their lawyers, from again
attempting to have nationwide classes certified over defendants’ opposition with respect to the same
claims”).
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their counsel as fomenting redundant litigation, Judge Easterbrook
observed that “when federal litigation is followed by many duplicative
state suits, it is sensible to handle the preclusive issue once and for all in
the original case, rather than put the parties and state judges through an
unproductive exercise.”96
Had he stopped there, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion would be
entirely defensible and sound. That duplicative or vexatious litigation
may readily warrant federal injunctive relief rather than reliance on the
state courts to dismiss each and every new suit commenced is a well
recognized and unremarkable proposition. In Wood v. Santa Barbara
Chamber of Commerce, Inc.,97 for instance, a photographer had initiated
an action ten years earlier, alleging misappropriation of photographs he
had taken. After several of his earlier actions were consolidated, the
plaintiff commenced a new action in the Federal District Court of
Nevada against 253 defendants. While that case was pending, however,
the plaintiff brought 35 additional, separate actions in 30 different
jurisdictions. The district court then dismissed all claims against all
defendants and entered a permanent injunction against the plaintiff from
filing similar litigation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the
permanent injunction, finding that the district court possessed authority
under the All Writs Act to issue “an injunction against repetitive
litigation.”98 The court of appeals observed that the plaintiff “has shown
his intention continually to relitigate claims that have been previously
dismissed.”99 Following reasoning similar to that employed by Judge
Easterbrook in Bridgestone/Firestone II, the Ninth Circuit in Wood
recognized the many advantages to the judicial system of employing
injunctive relief to thwart a vexatious litigant:
One advantage of dispensing injunctive relief against relitigation is that
it is an easy way to articulate forcefully the principles of collateral
estoppel and res judicata. For the judicial system, this means a
preservation of judicial resources. By describing the principles of
collateral estoppel in mandatory terms and by reinforcing those
principles with the threat of holding a vexatious litigant in contempt of
court, a district judge may deter the filing of frivolous and repetitive
lawsuits.100

The difficulty with Bridgestone/Firestone II, however, is that in
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Bridgestone/Firestone II, 333 F.3d at 766.
705 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1524.
Id.
Id.
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approving the issuance of an injunction against any effort to certify a
nationwide class in any other state court, the opinion sweeps with an
extremely broad brush. Thus, instead of saying only that injunctive
relief was necessary to thwart vexatious litigants from continued refiling
until they find some state court that would certify a nationwide class,
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion goes on to observe that absent class
members will always be bound by the actions of the named
representatives and their lawyers, provided that the non-participants
were adequately represented in the contest.101 Yet, on what basis does
Judge Easterbrook conclude that the named plaintiffs in the federal
Bridgestone/Firestone litigation before Judge Barker adequately
represented those who did not participate in the case? The court’s
conclusion, for which no supporting authorities were cited, rests solely
on the observation that the district court judge had found that “both the
named plaintiffs and their lawyers furnished adequate representation to
the other members of the putative classes” and that her decision “was not
challenged on the first appeal and is not contested now.”102
In concluding that the absent class members were adequately
represented in the federal litigation merely because that is what the
district judge found and because that finding was not challenged on
direct appeal, Easterbrook’s opinion seems to track the petitioners’
position in Stephenson—whether intentionally or otherwise—that
collateral challenges to a district court’s judgment on due process
grounds need not be permitted. It is enough, under this view, for a
district court judge to decide the question of adequacy in the first
instance and then to require any persons disagreeing with that decision
to lodge their disagreement before the same court that rendered the
adequacy determination, or on direct appeal.
Now, perhaps it is appropriate to limit the scope of Easterbrook’s
sweeping opinion by recognizing what it does not say: namely, that the
reason no collateral challenges to adequacy were brought by the absent
class members is that these plaintiffs were represented by the same
lawyers who represented the named class representatives in the federal
litigation. Consequently, they (or at least their lawyers) had no incentive
to and did not lodge any due process adequacy objections in the
subsequent state cases. While it may be sensible to enjoin these absent
class members and their counsel from relitigating the very same issue
that the named class representatives argued and lost in the Seventh
101. Bridgestone/Firestone II, 333 F.3d at 769.
102. Id.
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Circuit, it is unfortunate that Bridestone/Firestone II may be read as
broadly proscribing any collateral challenges on due process grounds to
the certifying court’s adequacy determination.
As litigants continue to parry over the scope of collateral review,
the battles will be waged against a rich backdrop of contemporary debate
over class action policy and procedure. That debate, broadly stated, pits
an individual litigant’s right to sue against the systemic value of finality
and resolution. The debate is certainly not new,103 but recent legislative
and judicial developments—of which Stephenson is one illustration—
reflect renewed interest in the balance between these competing
principles.
In recent years, a number of state legislatures have enacted class
action reform;104 the federal Congress has been working toward
compromise on the Class Action Fairness Act (which, as of this writing,
has passed in the House but supporters have not yet been able to bring it
to a full vote in the Senate);105 in September 2003, the U.S. Judicial
Conference approved changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;
and, of course, the United States Supreme Court has weighed in several
times in the last few years, most notably in Amchem and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.,106
on some of the essential problems with
representative litigation. These developments do not all point in one
direction but, collectively, they implicate the same thematic struggle
witnessed in Stephenson over competing judicial priorities: an individual
litigant’s right to sue balanced against collective resolution and finality;
fairness against efficiency; and “principle” versus “pragmatism,” to
reference Francis McGovern’s characterization.107 At least for the
103. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 203 (1950) (“However
convenient class suits may be, it is obvious that they do not comply with some well-recognized
general principles of law. The incongruity which startles us today is the disregard of the requirement
that a man ought to have his day in court—his rights and duties should not be adjudicated in his
absence.”).
104. For instance, effective September 1, 2003, the Texas legislature enacted reforms to class
action procedure under state law which, inter alia, place more stringent limits on obtaining class
certification under Texas law. All of the reforms were prompted by concerns over the perceived
abuses in class litigation. See generally Alistair Dawson, House Bill 4 and the Future of Class
Action Litigation, 24 THE ADVOCATE (Fall 2003), at 60.
105. The Class Action Fairness Act passed the House as H.R. 1115 and is still pending in the
Senate as S. 1751. The last attempt, on October 22, 2003, to bring the bill before the Senate
narrowly fell short. See Class Actions Motion to Bring Class Action Bill to Senate Floor Fails by
One Vote, 72 U.S.L.W. 2233 (Oct. 28, 2003).
106. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
107. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for State and Federal Judges in
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1870 (2000) (citing Amchem, Ortiz and other
judicial decisions and arguing that they reflect that “certain fundamental principles of our system of
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foreseeable future, the arguments of proponents and opponents of
collateral review will be played out against this dynamic judicial and
legislative canvas. As the political climate changes over class action
policy generally, it will undoubtedly also influence the shape of the
debate over the right to collaterally attack a certifying court’s judgment.
Whatever consequences Stephenson may hold for representative
litigation, the case may well carry even more significant implications
outside of the class context. As an empirical matter, we know that
litigants rarely bring due process collateral attacks on a certifying court’s
adequacy determination.108 Patrick Woolley reports that on only fortyfour occasions in the last thirty years have absent class members
collaterally attacked a judgment based on inadequate representation.109
While collateral attacks in the class context are an infinitesimal
percentage of state and federal dockets, collateral attacks are far more
frequently brought by absent defendants challenging the jurisdictional
authority of a court to enter binding judgment against them. David
Shapiro and his co-authors of the amicus brief in support of respondents
in Stephenson argued that if adequacy of representation is the theoretical
basis for binding absent class members to a judgment brought by others
on their behalf, minimum contacts is the theoretically equivalent basis
for justifying a court’s jurisdiction over any absent defendant.110 Any
restriction, then, on the right to collaterally attack the certifying court’s
adequacy determination would also invite restrictions on the right to
collaterally attack other bases for binding absent parties to judgment,
they argued. Consider the likely consequences, the Law Professors’
Brief urged the Court, of adopting petitioners’ argument that the
certifying court alone would determine adequacy:
Is this Court then prepared to rule, as it almost certainly would be
asked to do, that a procedure for determining minimum contacts (when
the defendant is absent) should end all later inquiry into that
jurisdictional question? With respect to petitioners’ fall-back position–
that the second court should not review adequacy de novo–would not
the logical next step be that, to the extent a second court can still
review a first court’s finding of minimum contacts, that review must
not proceed de novo?111

Having framed the issue in the Stephenson case as fundamentally
litigation have triumphed over pragmatism”).
108. Woolley, supra note 60, at 443.
109. Id. at n.268.
110. Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors, supra note 78, at 17.
111. Id. at 17-18.
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jurisdictional in nature, the Law Professors’ Brief concluded that the
argument for retaining the traditional rule allowing collateral attacks is
compelling:
Adequacy of representation is the bedrock guarantee provided all
absent class members in every form of class action in every court,
federal and state . . . . But once one accepts that adequacy is the
lynchpin of the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction–a reading
consistent with all the provisions of Rule 23 as well at that rule’s
historical foundations and the arguments made at the time it was
adopted, the adoption of any one of Petitioner’s positions might well
amount to an unintended earthquake in procedural law.112

If Shapiro and his co-authors are right, then the shock waves from a
restriction on de novo collateral review in the class action context could
reverberate throughout the judicial system. It is this kind of “unintended
earthquake” that should encourage lawyers—on both sides of the bar—
to take the non-decision in Stephenson very seriously indeed.
B. Looking Beyond Syngenta
We have spoken, thus far, of the possible legal implications from
the debate over collateral review in Stephenson and suggested that the
willingness of four justices to reverse the Second Circuit may encourage
reconsideration of heretofore settled rules of law both in and out of the
class action context. It should be clear, though, that what is not ripe for
reconsideration, in any context, is the argument the Court resoundingly
rejected in Syngenta for invoking the residual power embodied in the
All Writs Act to remove a state case not within the federal district
court’s original jurisdiction. But if Syngenta closed the door to that
procedural mechanism for protecting a federal court’s judgment or its
ongoing jurisdiction, it left unresolved several much harder issues. Most
centrally, the Chief Justice’s passing recitation in Syngenta that a prior
federal judgment may be enforced either by an anti-suit injunction or
through assertion of a preclusion defense in the state court, raises several
key questions. On what occasions is a federal court authorized to enjoin
litigants from pursuing a parallel or subsequent state suit? Does the
scope of this authority depend on whether it is sought before113 or
112. Id. at 19-20.
113. Cf. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133,
145 (3d Cir. 1998). The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a request to enjoin parallel state
litigation, noting that “[t]here is no classwide settlement pending before the district court (indeed,
the conditional class certification by the district court no longer subsists) and no stipulation of
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after114 the federal court enters judgment following the jury’s verdict or
pursuant to a class settlement? If so, in what respects? Even if an
injunction is authorized—either before or after judgment—on what
occasions should a federal court stay its hand and not interfere with the
state proceedings? This latter question, in turn, raises a corollary set of
inquires concerning the competence by state courts to enforce federal
rights and obligations, a subject that also bears relevance in the
application of recognized federal common law abstention doctrines.
These questions are not easily answered. As a general proposition,
parallel proceedings (whether they be in different state courts or in
federal and state court) addressing the same in personam cause of action
are permissible in our federal system. As the Third Circuit observed in
Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc.,115 “simultaneous federal and state
adjudications of the same in personam cause of action do not of
themselves trigger the necessary in aid exception [of the Anti-Injunction
Act], and the letter and spirit of the Anti-Injunction Act and All-Writs
Act counsel a restrictive application of that exception.”116
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers,117 the Supreme Court emphasized the key role that federalism
principles play in the presumption for deference:
settlement or prospect of settlement in that court is imminent.” Id.
114. Where settlement of the class litigation has been approved by the court under Rule 23(e),
use of the injunctive power has been approved to enjoin absent class members from bringing
subsequent state actions. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D.
Tex 1978), aff’d 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981) (Fifth Circuit upheld injunction proscribing the
filing of state court suits issued by district court after its certification of the consolidated lawsuits as
a mandatory class action, reasoning that the “in aid of its jurisdiction” and “to protect and effectuate
its judgments” exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act applied where the district court had already
approved settlement, as to most defendants, at the time the injunction issued). Injunctions have
even issued where a settlement was close but not yet finalized. See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United
Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1985) (injunction upheld where imminent settlement was
regarded as “the virtual equivalent of a res” under the “in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to § 2283
and where it was found that “the potential for an onslaught of state actions threatened to seriously
impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to approve settlements in the multi-district
litigation”); In re Asbestos School Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 61156, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 16,
1991) , aff’d mem. 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991) (observing that “this court’s ability to oversee a
possible settlement would be seriously impaired by a continuing litigation of parallel actions”);
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (anti-suit injunction approved, citing
Asbestos School Litigation and Baldwin-United, where class action settlement was “imminent”).
For additional authorities and an excellent, comprehensive description of the case law, see Georgene
M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum Selection and Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction, et al,
ALI-ABA, CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, available at SHO63
ALI-ABA, pt. 3-4, at 221, 350-66 (Jan. 2003).
115. 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993).
116. Id. at 202.
117. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
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Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state
court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state
courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the
controversy. The explicit wording of [§] 2283 itself implies as much,
and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads
inevitably to that conclusion.118

Yet, even with a presumption in favor of deference based on “the
fundamental principle of a dual system of courts,” friction between
coordinate judiciaries is inevitable and the costs of such friction will
often be too substantial to ignore. The Anti-Injunction Act, with its
narrow but vital exceptions, simultaneously recognizes the virtue of
reducing jurisdictional conflicts between coordinate courts as well as the
need for preempting threats to the integrity of a state court’s
judgment.119 The effort to accommodate these competing values in a
single statute has proved a nettlesome problem, however. ThenProfessor Diane Wood once observed, drawing on David Currie’s earlier
work, that the Anti-Injunction Act “is badly in need of attention . . . .
The Act still suffers from ‘dense clouds of ambiguity,’ and still might
fairly be called the ‘most obscure of jurisdictional statutes.’”120 As a
result of all of this ambiguity and the inherent tensions at play in the
statute, it is not always clear when a federal injunction may issue, even if
it is abundantly clear from experience there will be occasions that
warrant the enjoining of concurrent or subsequent state proceedings.
One reflection of this uncertainty in the law is the effort by the
Board of Editors of the Manual for Complex Litigation to summarize the
relevant doctrinal rules. Thus, the current Draft Copy of the Fourth
Edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation begins the section on
Jurisdictional Conflicts with this advice: “An injunction against pending
state proceedings, even if authorized by federal statutes and case law can
have a detrimental effect on future efforts to work cooperatively and
should be used only as a last resort, if at all.”121 The Manual then notes
that exceptional circumstances may justify departure from the general
presumption, and proceeds to list some occasions when enjoining
litigants from prosecuting concurrent state actions may be warranted.

118. Id. at 297.
119. See generally, Hoffman, supra note 13, at 459-61.
120. Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the AntiInjunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 320 (quoting David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the
American Law Institute, pt. 2, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 322 (1969)).
121. Draft Copy, Manual for Complex Litigation § 20.32 at 237 (4th ed. 2003) [hereafter
MANUAL].
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For instance the Manual notes that the Anti-Injunction Act and All
Writs Act have been used to enjoin state litigation “that would require
relitigation in state court of a matter finally decided in federal court” or
to “stay orders that would otherwise prevent a federal court from
proceeding with pretrial aspects of the litigation.”122 These observations
are empirically correct, of course, but necessarily incomplete. Even if
the relitigation exception to § 2283 would allow an injunction to issue
when the matter previously has been decided, why does deference to the
state court not counsel discretion against interference absent a showing
that the state judge is incapable or unwilling to properly apply preclusion
law to protect the federal judgment? As noted above, the Chief Justice’s
opinion in Syngenta certainly leaves this question unresolved.123
Another occasion the Manual references which may warrant the
issuance of a federal judicial injunction to stay state proceedings is
“where a class has been certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), and where class members have failed to avail themselves of
their right to opt out and litigate their claims independently in state or
federal court.”124 No exception is listed or cross reference made,
however, to occasions where the absent class members’ subsequent state
suit also involves a collateral attack on the adequacy determination in
the judgment of the certifying court; in other words, the question
implicated by the ambiguous outcome in Stephenson. On still other
points, the Manual is not up to date with current law,125 a problem the
authors concede is inevitable with the project and one about which they
wisely remind lawyers to be cautious.126
My point is not to identify shortcomings of the Manual. It is a
masterful work of enormous value to the bench and bar. Instead, the
critique goes to the difficulties inherent in marking the boundaries
between deference to state courts and the unavoidable need for some
authority to stay litigation that threatens a court’s continuing jurisdiction
or prior judgment. The challenge of identifying these boundaries—of
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36.
124. MANUAL, supra note 121, § 20.32 at 239.
125. See, e.g., id. (noting that the Anti-Injunction Act and All Writs Act have been used “to
effectuate global settlements in large scale litigation by enjoining or removing to federal court
parallel state court litigation that would otherwise frustrate the adoption or implementation of
comprehensive class settlements approved by the federal court as binding on the parties to the state
court litigation” but failing to cite the Court’s recent decision in Syngenta as foreclosing the removal
option).
126. See id. at 2 (“[I]t should go without saying that changes in statutes, case law, regulations,
and technology will quickly date some specific references in the Manual and users need to exercise
standard research practices.”).
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finding the right balance—has not escaped the Supreme Court. In this
regard, I have said that the problem of Syngenta is that while the Court
rejected a residual authority permitting removal of state cases to protect
federal judgments and jurisdiction, it gave no guidance to order the
choice of alternatives. Of course, Syngenta was certainly not the first
time the Court has failed to clarify the ordering of options for protecting
federal judgments.
Rivet v. Regions Bank127 concerned the power of a federal
bankruptcy court to remove a case from Louisiana state court on the
ground that the plaintiff’s state cause of action was completely precluded
by the bankruptcy court’s prior judgment on a federal question. The
Fifth Circuit had affirmed the denial of remand, citing Federated
Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie128 for the proposition that a defendant
could remove a case “where a plaintiff files a state cause of action
completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a question of
federal law.”129 The Supreme Court in Rivet reversed the appellate
court, emphasizing that “Moitie did not create a preclusion exception to
the rule, fundamental under currently governing legislation, that a
defendant cannot remove on the basis of a federal defense.”130
Moreover, the Court observed:
In sum, claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a
defensive plea that provides no basis for removal under § 1441(b).
Such a defense is properly made in the state proceedings, and the state
courts’ disposition of it is subject to this Court’s ultimate review.131

Had the Court stopped there, it would have brought some clarity to the
law. Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg then proceeded to add an
accompanying footnote to the sentence emphasizing the importance of
deference to the state court in federal claim preclusion cases. “We note
also,” she said, seemingly in passing, that under the relitigation
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, a federal court
may enjoin state-court proceedings “where necessary . . . to protect or
effectuate its judgments.”132
The footnote has proved pernicious. Before Syngenta, the Eighth
Circuit cited the Rivet footnote as some support for invoking the All

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

522 U.S. 470 (1998).
452 U.S. 394 (1981).
Rivet v. Regions Bank, 108 F.3d 576, 586 (5th Cir. 1997).
Rivet, 522 U.S. at 478.
Id.
Id. at 478 n.3.
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Writs Act to remove a case otherwise subject to being enjoined under the
relitigation exception to § 2283.133 Ginsburg’s footnote in Rivet, the
Eighth Circuit opined, merely “points out another procedural option, but
we do not read footnote three to rule out the one we approved.”134 By
suggesting that deference to the state court is one—but not the only—
option available to a federal court in a federal claim preclusion case, the
Rivet footnote adds uncertainty to the law, just as the Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in Syngenta similarly clouds the water. All of this
is to say that we must wait for another day to learn how the Court
balances the competing priorities of minimizing interference with state
judicial proceedings against the felt need on some occasions for federal
judicial authority to restrain the prosecution of coordinate state
proceedings.
C. Lessons from Syngenta and Stephenson
I have not endeavored to suggest a complete framework to guide
the Court in balancing these competing priorities. Still, by closely
examining the strategic decision-making by litigants and their lawyers in
Syngenta and Stephenson and assessing how that behavior exerted an
influence on judicial decision-making in the cases, this study suggests
some insights relevant to defining reasonable parameters for the federal
judicial injunctive authority. While federalism interests are one
important aspect of the problem, Syngenta and Stephenson stand as
testimony that there are other considerations that bear important
relevance on how those limits are defined. Given the fact specific
character of all litigation, complex or otherwise, no comprehensive list is
possible of all relevant variables but several significant factors are worth
emphasizing.
One important consideration in the class action context is the power
of the federal district court to enjoin nonresident absent class members.
While the failure of a class member to opt out of (at least some) Rule
23(b)(3) actions is a necessary condition if she otherwise lacks minimum
contacts with the forum where the class certification order was
entered,135 a failure to opt-out is not a sufficient condition for exercising
territorial jurisdiction over her if the minimum procedural due process
requirements of Shutts are not satisfied. Where a nonresident class
133. NAACP v. Metro. Council, 144 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826
(1998).
134. Id.
135. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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member is beyond the territorial reach of the forum, her right to
collaterally attack the certifying court’s judgment on procedural due
process grounds is protected by constitutional limits on personal
jurisdiction, just as any nonresident defendant may challenge a judgment
entered without proper jurisdiction.136 Consequently, an injunction by a
federal district judge against a nonresident class member’s collateral
attack in a distant forum should not succeed unless the absent class
member otherwise possesses sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state. To permit an injunction without sufficient minimum
contacts would, in effect, read into the All Writs Act (the source of the
district court’s injunctive authority) nationwide territorial jurisdictional
authority to bind all persons from challenging the court’s judgment,
without regard to their lack of minimum contacts with the forum. Yet,
as Professor Monaghan has argued:
[T]he All Writs Act cannot properly be read to side-step standard tests
governing in personam jurisdiction. . . . [None of the Court’s prior
precedents provide a basis] for believing that the Act should be
construed as a general ‘emergency all purpose’ nationwide long-arm
statute used to relax the requirements of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) whenever a
court deems that result desirable.137

A second important consideration in addressing the scope of the
federal judicial injunctive authority is to distinguish between occasions
where the state suit is brought before judgment has been rendered in the
federal forum, from cases where the jurisdiction is concurrent and
overlapping with ongoing proceedings. While the case law already
recognizes this distinction, as noted earlier,138 we would do well to
provide a more complete account to explain why the two circumstances
pose different challenges and issues.
When the second suit is brought after judgment, we are squarely
faced with the question left unanswered from Syngenta: issuance of an
injunction before the state court rules on the preclusive effect of a prior
federal judgment or deference to the state court to make that
determination without interference. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
136. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996). A person “is not bound by a
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process” Id. at 798 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940)). “The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of
voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger” Id. at 800 n.5 (quoting Chase Nat. Bank v.
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934)).
137. Monaghan, supra note 11, at 1190-91.
138. See supra notes 21-22.
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opinion offers no express guidance on this choice, in considering the
propriety of injunctive relief it is important to keep in mind the strenuous
assertions made by defendants—ultimately accepted by the district judge
and Eleventh Circuit, and not contradicted by the Supreme Court—that
the Henson plaintiffs’ state suit in Iberville Parish was a direct threat to
the prior settlement in Price.139 Moreover, with the state suit having
been brought by the same lawyer against the same defendant for the
same injuries for which the same plaintiffs were compensated by the
federal settlement, it hardly seems surprising that the Supreme Court
suggested an anti-suit injunction would have been warranted.
Recognition of this point might lead us in future cases, where less
baggage accompanies the state suit, to ask whether there are credible
reasons to doubt that the state court can correctly interpret the preclusive
effect of the prior federal judgment. Lacking any such credible basis, I
suggest that the presumption ought to be that the state judge is
competent to get it right.140
Additionally, when suit is brought after judgment it is important to
distinguish a single state case being brought from instances where the
state suit is one of several or many other suits filed. In this latter
circumstance there may be sound reasons for being concerned, as the
Seventh Circuit was in Bridgestone/Firestone II, that “[r]elitigation can
turn even an unlikely outcome into reality”141 and thereby justify on
efficiency and fairness grounds the imposition of an injunction
precluding multiple efforts at relitigation.
When the second suit is brought before final judgment in another
forum, other considerations are involved. Usually, the assertion made to
justify an anti-suit injunction is that the parallel state case threatens the
federal court’s ability to do its job.142 In these circumstances, it is
important to keep in mind the judge’s role in carefully scrutinizing the
139. See supra text accompanying notes10-11. See also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson,
527 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (petitioners arguing that the Henson state suit “frustrated the express terms
of the [federal] settlement”).
140. The Court’s oft-cited preference for avoiding interfering with state judicial proceedings,
see supra notes 117-18, supports application of a high presumption of competency before
intervention is justified, even if the Court’s decision in Parsons Steel does incentivize litigants to
secure injunctive relief from the federal court before the state court has ruled. See Wood, supra
note 120, at 306 (observing that “[t]he first consequence [of Parsons Steel] totally ignores the
comity and federalism basis of the Anti-Injunction Act, and the second comes close to violating
principles underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”); see also Hoffman, supra note 13, at 454
(commenting that “the decision in Parsons Steel is anomalous because it permits—indeed, even
encourages—litigants to seek injunctive relief before exhausting all other available remedies”).
141. Bridgestone/Firestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2003).
142. See supra authorities cited in notes 113-14.
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threat that the state suit allegedly poses to the ongoing proceedings. For
instance, the court can compare the pleadings: are the claims identical or
only overlapping? It may also compare the parties in the different suits:
are the same parties involved or are the plaintiffs and the injuries for
which they seek recovery distinct? What about the lawyers? Are the
same counsel involved in all of the cases?143 The need for close scrutiny
of the relatedness of claims and parties and why these considerations are
so critical to the evaluation of the scope of the federal judicial injunctive
authority may be illustrated by a personal story.
When I was in private practice, I represented a couple who brought
suit in state court in Texas against a life insurance company for recovery
of gift taxes they had incurred in reliance on the company’s
representations in connection with the sale of a life insurance policy.
The policy was owned by a legal trust that the insurance company
advised my clients to set up. The gift taxes were the result of annual
payments made to the trust to cover the costs of the premiums for the
policy. Prior to the filing of this suit, claims were already being asserted
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
on behalf of all owners of insurance policies, one of whom was the legal
trust my clients had set up. Not unexpectedly, the defendant removed
the Texas state suit to the Southern District of Texas and then moved to
have it transferred to the federal court in California, asserting that the
claims brought by my clients were identical to and redundant of those
being litigated in that class action. Before the federal judge in
California, defendant sought dismissal of my client’s claims and to
enjoin them from seeking recovery outside of the class proceedings.
Ultimately, we prevailed in convincing the court that my clients did
not come within the class definition and that their claims were distinct
from and not covered by the claims being asserted in that case. The
point of this story, however, is not that we were ultimately right (we
were, of course); rather it is to emphasize how high the stakes were in
these pretrial battles. Everything turned on how the court interpreted the
relatedness of the claims being asserted. Had we lost and been
consolidated into the class litigation, it is unlikely that my clients would
have received the same (or perhaps any of the) relief that they sought out
of the class litigation.
This anecdotal evidence is consistent with the broader empirical

143. For a critical look at the policy debates that underlie aggregation of related cases, see
Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG.
231 (1991).
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evidence we have regarding mass litigation. From both the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s perspective, relatedness of claims and of parties marks
the decisive pretrial struggle in many complex litigation cases. Figures
from the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, as reported by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, reflect that from
October 1, 2001, through September 30, 2002, a request to the Panel for
transfer was made, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, in 7,258 civil actions
and that in 7,063 of these cases transfer was ordered. Transfer was not
ordered in only 195 actions (or less than three percent).144 These striking
figures reflect no short term trend.145 Furthermore, we also know from
the federal experience that after a case is assigned to a pretrial court for
consolidated or coordinated pretrial purposes it almost never is
remanded to the trial court. From its inception in 1968 through
September 30, 2002, there were 179,071 civil action cases consolidated
for pretrial purposes under § 1407 (or originally filed in the transferee
court and thereby became part of the MDL proceedings). Of these
179,071 cases, 129,594 were terminated by the transferee court; only
10,381 actions were ever remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings (or “reassigned,” if the case was sent back to a court within
the same district), resulting in a remand to pretrial termination ratio of
less than six percent.146

144. See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 26
(2002). Even these figures probably overstate the grant to denial rate on transfer motions since the
Administrative Office’s figure of 195 reflects those cases where the Panel “did not order transfer”
and does not distinguish between those instances in which transfer was denied and those in which
the motion for transfer was withdrawn by the parties, following settlement or other voluntary
disposition.
145. In his discussion of the federal MDL practice, Earle Kyle has noted that “in 1995 the
Panel transferred 12,768 cases . . . for inclusion in coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,
and declined to transfer only 84 actions.” See Earle F. Kyle, IV, The Mechanics of Motion Practice
Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 589, 590 (1998) (citing REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 31-32 & tables S-21 and S-22
(1995)).
146. See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 144, at S-19 and S-20. One might object that
these figures are somewhat misleading since most cases generally in the civil system never reach
trial. This ignores, however, that once a case is consolidated into a MDL proceeding the pretrial
dynamic of a case is dramatically altered. Although good data does not exist to compare MDL and
non-MDL cases, we do know from other empirical work that when plaintiff’s case is moved from
the forum of its choosing to another, plaintiff’s win rate drops significantly. See Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1507
(1995) (the plaintiffs’ win rate drops from 58% to 29% after successful transfer under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a)); see also Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581,
581 (1998) (empirical study demonstrates that removal significantly improves defendant’s win rate
at trial as compared with cases where removal was unsuccessful).
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In sum, this data regarding the federal multidistrict litigation
experience with 28 U.S.C. § 1407 underscores how critical is a court’s
determination concerning relatedness of claims and parties. By
recognizing the evaluative responsibility courts bear in making these
determinations, we are reminded of the need not only for adequate
procedures to be applied in particular cases but also for appropriate
doctrinal rules governing coordinate litigation. If the parties are not
properly incentivized to present all relevant information to the court and
to adequately represent those they purport to represent, then there is a
need for rules to ensure due process protections are afforded. After all,
even the most capable of jurists on our state and federal benches cannot
be expected to reach the right conclusions if the information presented to
them is incomplete or otherwise inadequate.
When the trial judge fails to carry out his evaluative responsibilities
in overseeing the conduct of the litigation, we can expect unfortunate
outcomes. In Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank,147 the Seventh
Circuit heard an appeal from a district court’s order approving a
settlement of consumer-finance class action litigation. Taxpayers
entitled to a refund from the federal government must usually wait
several weeks before receiving it. Recognizing that some do not want to
wait this long, H & R Block and Beneficial offered to lend customers the
amount of the refund. In exchange for lending this money, the customer
was charged a significant interest rate, even on loans as short as a couple
of days. The most serious charge plaintiffs leveled at the defendants,
according to the Seventh Circuit, was that H & R Block led customers to
believe that they were acting as the customer’s agent or fiduciary when,
in fact and without disclosure, H & R Block shared in the loan
proceeds.148
Numerous suits were filed, starting in 1990, against Beneficial and
H & R Block and while many were dismissed several remained pending
by the late 1990s. Though none had yet gone to trial, one class action in
Texas had been certified and was fast approaching its trial date. In that
suit, plaintiffs sought damages of nearly $2 billion. While the case was
still pending, two lawyers who had previously brought unsuccessful
cases against Beneficial and H & R Block had lunch with Beneficial’s
lead counsel. At this lunch, they apparently began to discuss (though no
formal negotiations took place) a global settlement of all claims,
including claims against H & R Block. Adding a few reinforcements,
147. 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002).
148. Id. at 280.
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the same lawyers thereafter filed several new class action suits,
including one in United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. After a brief period of negotiation and procedural maneuvering,
a settlement was reached and submitted to the federal district judge to
approve.
The settlement contemplated that Beneficial and H & R Block
would create a $25 million fund to pay all claims. Several objectors
strenuously opposed the settlement, arguing that the agreement was a
sham, a kind of “reverse auction” whereby “the defendant in a series of
class actions picks the most ineffectual class lawyers to negotiate a
settlement with in the hope that the district court will approve a weak
settlement that will preclude other claims against the defendant.”149
Despite obvious conflicts of interest within the class, the district judge
approved the settlement and, in the process, also encouraged the
plaintiffs’ lawyers not to file their fee applications publicly. The district
judge also enjoined the Texas suit on the theory that the suit might derail
the federal settlement. The Seventh Circuit reversed.
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner described the factual
background that led to the settlement. While he observed that “there is
no proof that the settlement was actually collusive in the reverse-auction
sense,” he also concluded:
[T]he circumstances demanded closer scrutiny than the district judge
gave it. He painted with too broad a brush, substituting intuition for
the evidence and careful analysis that a case of this magnitude, and
settlement proposal of such questionable antecedents and
circumstances, required.150

Further, the appellate court found it remarkable, “in view of the progress
and promise of the Texas suit relative to the half-hearted efforts of the
settlement class counsel,” that the district judge enjoined prosecution of
the Texas case.151 Posner continued:
The effect of the injunction is that the settlement release, if upheld,
would release the claims in the Texas suit. For this release of
potentially substantial claims against H & R Block, the settlement class
received no consideration. In fact the settlement class received no
consideration for the release of any claims against Block . . . . The
lawyers for the settlement class were richly rewarded for negotiations
149. Id. at 282 (citing, inter alia, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 392 (2000)).
150. Id. at 283.
151. Id.
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that greatly diminished the cost of settlement to Beneficial from the
level that it had considered to be in the ballpark years earlier when the
cases were running more in its favor than when the settlement
agreement was negotiated. In effect, the settlement values the Texas
and all other claims against Block at zero.152

In Beneficial, as it has done in several other cases,153 the Seventh
Circuit described the role of the district judge in reviewing the fairness
of any proposed settlement in class litigation as “a fiduciary to the class,
who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of
fiduciaries.”154 Other circuits have similarly emphasized the fiduciary
obligations owed by the district judge to the class members.155
Sensible opinions, like Posner’s in Beneficial, stress the evaluative
responsibility courts bear in overseeing litigant behavior. The story of
the Beneficial litigation helps make the point that doctrinal safeguards
are important but, standing alone, are also insufficient. We know from
empirical evidence that the influence of objectors in reducing collusive
behavior is limited since objectors are rather infrequent participants in
class litigation;156 and even when they are involved, there is often no
alignment between the interests of objectors (who often will settle for a
quick payoff) and those of the absent class.157 Even the right to
collateral attack itself has a marginal policing effect since, as noted
earlier, such challenges are rarely brought and even less often are
successful.158At the end of the day, all of the debate over doctrinal law
will amount to little if the fiduciary obligations of trial judges in
monitoring litigants and the litigation before them are not taken
seriously.

152. Id. at 283-84.
153. Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002); Stewart v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985).
154. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 280.
155. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); Grant v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987).
156. See Thomas E. Willging, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 140 (1996) (in examination of fairness hearings in
four federal judicial districts, there were no objectors in 42-64% of the cases).
157. The Advisory Committee Notes to the most recent amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure emphasize the not infrequent disconnect between the objectors’ interests
and those of absent class members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes (“Such
objections [by objectors that the proposed settlement is not fair, reasonable, or adequate on grounds
that apply generally to a class or subclass], which purport to represent class-wide interests, may
augment the opportunity for obstruction or delay.”); see also Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen,
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1104-12 (1996).
158. See Woolley, supra note 60, at 443.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In closing, we may reflect on how remarkable it is that the Supreme
Court over these last two terms has wrestled with the problem of
defining the scope of the federal power to enjoin state proceedings.
Outside observers might be excused for thinking that the boundaries
would have been decided long ago. After all, more than two centuries
have elapsed since the establishment of our dual system of state and
federal courts and one need hardly doubt that “our fractured
jurisdictional mosaic,” to use Bob Cover’s apt description,159 has offered
myriad occasions for the Court to address the parameters of federal
judicial injunctive power over state courts. Certainly those early
legislators who enacted the Anti-Injunction Act in 1793 must have
expected that their tightly-drawn statute would have helped to squarely
set boundaries between state and federal courts. Yet, while the Court
has taken up the proper application of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 on many
occasions and some clear boundaries have been drawn, it is beyond cavil
that the scope of federal judicial power to enjoin parallel state
proceedings or a subsequently filed state suit has remained a subject of
much uncertainty for the better part of two centuries.
In the foreseeable future we will continue to face difficult and
important questions about how to handle jurisdictional conflicts between
state and federal courts. When may—or, for that matter, when must—
state judges be relied upon to vindicate prior federal orders and/or to
protect the integrity of ongoing proceedings? Alternatively, when is it
appropriate not to rely on the state court to adequately protect federal
jurisdiction and, instead, to issue injunctive relief to enjoin litigants from
pursuing parallel or subsequent state litigation?
While the Court has emphasized the role that federalism principles
play in defining the limits of the federal judicial injunctive power, these
doctrinal guideposts should not cause us to overlook the important role
of strategic decision-making by litigants and their lawyers and how that
behavior, in turn, influences judicial decision-making. Taken together,
Syngenta and Stephenson suggest that we must be more conscious of the
incentives and disincentives that guide the decision to bring parallel or
subsequent litigation. The assumptions we make that support the trust
we ascribe to judgments are relevant if we ever hope to reach principled
answers to the important questions that remain, unanswered and
provocatively, in the uncertain aftermath of Syngenta and Stephenson.

159. Cover, supra note 4, at 640-41.
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